On deterrence: Iran's attack on Israel

 After October 7, I observed that Israel lived or died by deterrence.  Its strategic imperative was to respond with sufficient force to deter further attacks, including by regional powers.  Israel responded, instead, with so little force that it barely touched Hamas, keeping in mind again that the casualty figures from Gaza are lies.  Israel has abandoned the fight.  Yet, Israel also killed several Iranian military officers in Damascus.  Iran has been fighting Israel through proxies.  They have been providing assistance to Hamas, and while there was initial speculation about their involvement in October 7, subsequent intelligence suggested that Iran was not involved.  Yet both Hezbollah and the Houthis are essentially Iranian proxies, and Hezbollah has been shooting missiles into Israel throughout this conflict, and attacking Israel for a long time.  Israel has been engaged in a proxy war with Iran for years.  Yet the Damascus strike escalated, and Iran responded.

There are several ways to examine what Iran has done.  They sent a few drones, and it appears as though Israel's missile defense system got nearly all of them.  Iran's attack was calibrated to what Israel's defense system would stop.  Notice that.  Iran does not want a direct engagement.  Neither does Israel.  Both sides know that.  Israel has nukes, but Iran does not.  Yet, Iran cannot, for the sake of its own credibility, watch the Damascus strike without a response.  Iran's best move?  A strike that it knows Israel can likely swat away, so that Israel has no strategic need for a significant escalation.  Israel will have some response, because Iran attacked, but it will be small, and calibrated, because Israel does not want a direct engagement with Iran.  These are pot-shots.  Israel has no will to fight, and Iran won't engage a nuclear power with enough force to force the issue.

Calm down.

What does this mean for deterrence?  There are several interpretations.  In one sense, we can argue that Israel's insufficient response to October 7 emboldened Iran to launch a direct strike.  In another sense, we can note that a few drones, destroyed by Israel's "Iron Dome," was a small and nearly insignificant move, almost necessitated by the Damascus strike.  So really, did Israel's deterrence remain stronger than I had asserted?  Maybe.

Relatedly, the very purpose of Iran's response is to maintain its deterrent capability.  As a nation, any nation must deter attacks by threatening to respond with force if attacked.  I'm about as pro-Israel as one gets, but let's be clear.  Israel attacked Iran directly.  Maintaining a deterrent threat required a response of some kind.

Yes, it is OK to admit that Israel struck first.  At least in some sense.  In another sense, Iran struck first, through proxies, which means we can ask whether or not the Damascus strike was truly a first strike, justified, and so forth, but there is at least a case to be made for Iran's response.  And really, when the drones are easily shot down by the Iron Dome, isn't that pretty much the resolution we want, if we are being fully rational?

Pause.  Be rational.  Iran needed to respond to what was at least arguably a first strike by Israel, even if the Damascus strike was defensible as a response to attacks through proxies.  So, Iran used a silly drone strike that the Iron Dome could easily defeat, thereby maintaining what credibility they need without unnecessary escalation.

Remember that this is coming from the analyst arguing for total war against Gaza, but there's a path forward here, with off-ramps, if the parties take it.  I don't see how Iran couldn't have responded.

Which brings up another point.  Congress seems to be moving forward with an aid package for Israel.  They didn't do anything after October 7, but Iran sends some ineffectual drones, and that prompts movement?  Biden calls the G-7 together because of Iran?  Even though this was a completely ineffectual, symbolic response to Israel's Damascus strike.

This is backwards.  Iran isn't really the victim here, because they've been fighting Israel through multiple proxies, so I cannot work up any tears for them, but there is at least a case that Israel struck first.  It is not a case I believe, given their support for terrorist organizations around the world, including those engaged in attacks on Israel, including right now, but there is a case, since Israel was the side that shifted from proxy to direct.  October 7?  There is no case at all.  The world is backwards.

Iran has a case, and they had a strategic necessity to reply, which they did, with calibration.

How am I, of all people, sounding like a defender of Iran?

Observation of the day:  when you live outside of all bubbles, you have no compunction about challenging anyone's side.  One of the worst things about academia, and indeed, how it went wrong is by creating a hermetically sealed ideological bubble where dissent is not tolerated.

I dissent.

No music today.  My recommendation to the entirely hypothetical reader beyond those reading in bad faith seeking ammunition (hi!) is this:  dissent.  Question, challenge, and dissent.