Musonius on the right of self-defense, or lack thereof

 Let's step back again, and do more stoic philosophy, relevant to issues of the day, but not direct policy analysis.  As promised, we shall continue examining the ideas of Musonius Rufus, who was among the more challenging thinkers of his school.  I began a series addressing Musonius last weekend, as I find many of his surviving lectures to be insightful.  Yet, I feel no obligation to defer to anyone, ever, including Musonius Rufus.  Of course, when someone makes a compelling case for an idea with which I disagree, I must consider, and if nothing else, Musonius will make you think.  Let us consider, now, the question of a right of self-defense.  I think that this is a universal right.  Musonius disagrees, and given the importance of the notion to all things political in the world today, we must consider Musonius.  His lectures were not sermons on the mount.  He was a stoic philosopher, linking Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus to his student, Epictetus.  As such, his ideas were notably similar to Epictetus, but different in important ways.  While he was not an advocate of violence, and his philosophy bore a resemblance to turning the other cheek, his reasoning was different.

To read through Musonius's lectures (I like Cynthia King's translations), one sees the following claim repeated.  That which appears evil is not evil, and that which appears good is not good.  The only evil, and hence, the only harm is to act without virtue.  No one can force you to act without virtue, which is the only evil, so no one can harm you.  Only you can harm yourself, which you do by acting without virtue.

If you are assaulted, then, you are not harmed.  The one who assaulted you acted without virtue, and hence harmed himself, but he did not harm you because he did not cause you to act unvirtuously.  If you respond by acting unvirtuously, then you have harmed yourself by abandoning virtue.

But what of the injury, you ask?

What injury, Musonius responds?  That is merely an external.  It means nothing.  Your task is not to trouble yourself with externals, but only those things which matter.  Truth, virtue, these things matter.  Pain does not.  Epictetus took this point, and argued that you are only injured if you decide that you are injured.  It is your opinion, and hence your choice that determines injury, not the thing itself.

That was an interesting, and important elaboration on Musonius's point.  I think it makes more sense with Epictetus's elaboration, but the underlying principle is the same.  The injury is nothing in and of itself, according to this line of thinking.

If the injury is nothing in and of itself, then should you respond?  If so, how?  Certainly not with violence, nor even appealing to the law.  Musonius went that far.  Seriously.  If you are assaulted, you are not harmed, so there is no recourse as there is no need for it.  Adhere to virtue because if you do otherwise, you abandon virtue and therein lies the only harm, and therein lies the only evil.

This, of course, is a different rejection of the right of self-defense from a Jebuz-y turn-the-other-cheek speech.  It is not Buddhist, Jainist, nor any other pacifistic or vaguely pacifistic notion you conventionally know.  Musonius simply rejected the idea that you are harmed when assaulted, so defense against what?  To respond would be the act of abandoning virtue.

Consider the implications, not just for any nation's domestic law, but international affairs.

Remembering, of course, that it would have to cut both ways in any and all international disputes.

I do not agree with Musonius on this point.  He would berate me as a simpleton for failing to understand his simple proof, and perhaps I am, at that.  The rest of the professoriate certainly are worthless simpletons, so why should I be any different?  Professors all suck, and academia is useless.

I still maintain my right of freedom of thought, and I disagree with Musonius.

Here is where I think Musonius goes wrong.  Suppose we accept the claim that assault does no injury because it does not cause the assaulted party to act without virtue, that being the only harm, which can only be done to one's self.  If we grant that, then why is assault wrong?  If assault does no harm, then on what basis can we say that it is wrong?  Musonius would surely agree that assault is wrong, yet if it does no harm, then why?

Stoicism holds self restraint to be virtuous, so any assault committed out of a loss of temper would be unvirtuous, not for the harm, but because it demonstrated a loss of self-control, but consider an assault that was carefully considered, weighed against alternatives, and committed in coldness rather than rashness.  As long as the assault is not committed out of a loss of self-control, if it does no harm-- as Musonius asserts-- then why would it be wrong?

Epictetus and other stoics lean heavily on a kind of brotherhood of man claim for the importance of virtue and how one treats others, but if assault were no harm, then one could assault a member of that brotherhood because it would not do harm, so where would be the lack of virtue?

This, I think, is the consequence of pushing the principle too far.  As the cliche goes, any virtue taken too far becomes vice.  There is a valuable insight to the observation that you decide how to respond to events.  Epictetus, I think, had it closer to the truth, in a constrained way.  You do not control others, you control your response.  You decide your opinion of what happens.  Your judgment determines the matter.

If you assault me with intention, and do physical harm, then how might I judge that?  If the harm consists of a scrape or bruise, I might decide that the harm is no harm, right?  If I am paralyzed, that is something rather less realistic, although if you read about Epictetus's life, he walked the walk, which is actually a tasteless joke.  (Trust me.)

Yet what of words?  If you speak ill of me, and nothing more, it is entirely up to me if I decide that I am injured because "words are violence," (they most certainly are not) or whether I decide to follow the reasoning of everyone from Socrates up through his stoic intellectual descendants.  If you speak the truth, then I should heed your words, and if you do not, then what you say is irrelevant to me because the words of the unwise are irrelevant to those who are wise.  It is interesting and distressing how many of the younger generation truly believe that they are injured upon hearing words that they do not like, which is the circumstance in which Epictetus and Musonius truly apply.

In the case of physical injury-- assault, by the actual definition rather than how leftist children try to redefine and weaponize the word-- they are stretching it.  One follows the logic of Socrates.  Yet to find one's self paralyzed, or otherwise injured and say, I am not harmed, is a stretch.

And if we put that into principle, we return to the consequence of universalizing it.  How would assault be wrong?  As long as you speak truth, you are acting virtuously, but assault?  Musonius's logic turns assault into an act as inconsequential as breathing, or perhaps merely speaking true criticism, and hence legitimizes it in the same way that Socrates legitimizes true words that feel bad to hear.

If, though, assault is harm, then there must be a right of self-defense.  From the individual level to the policy implication to the international, there must be a right of self-defense because I have the right to act to prevent harm if you attempt it, along with the right to prevent future harm.

All of this is contingent on what harm is.  Here we see the breakdown between what is useful as a process of evaluating events and generalizable moral principle.  With respect to words, Musonius and Epictetus are just correct.  You are harmed if you believe yourself to be harmed.  Your judgment determines your harm.  You choose your response.

Words, of course, are not violence, and no one should indulge such rhetorical nonsense.

Shift to actual violence.  Were we to accept Musonius, the implications would be to legitimize violence rather than merely the pacifism that he prefers because without a harm principle, there is nothing to reject the act in the first place unless the act is done for loss of temper, which leaves a wide range.  Accepting that there is harm requires one to accept a right of self-defense, individually, politically, and internationally.

Yet how much are you harmed, and what is the best response given that?  The guidelines of Musonius may still apply.  Punch me, and if it is a glancing blow, under certain circumstances, depending on your motivation or extenuating circumstances, I may decide that the lack of any real damage would mean I am unharmed and that my best response would be to help one who is mentally ill, for example.

On the other hand, the same event happens without extenuating circumstances, and the full force of law is required to protect me from a threat of future injury.  Applying the principles, it is my judgment, not the thing.

All of this, however, reduces to the harm question.  Musonius makes a rather unusual claim.  Only you can prevent forest fires harm yourself, by acting unvirtuously.  Yet imagine that we all decided that Musonius was right.  I could decide, without anger or loss of self control, to commit an act of violence upon another, merely as a demonstration of a philosophical principle, as could anyone else, no harm being done.  So could everyone, at the same time.  An eye for a principle makes the whole world blind, with no anger, no malice, no harm by Musonius's definition, just worldwide, rank absurdity.

Or, we can acknowledge that maybe my boy, Musonius, got this one wrong, in which case, there must be a right of self-defense, because physical injuries created by assault are harm.

I think I'll keep going with Musonius for a bit.  He had a lot to say.  Interesting guy.

Leadbelly, "Defense Blues."