Why is this debt ceiling crisis different from all other debt ceiling crises?

 This morning, I look down at my hot, steaming, glorious mug of coffee and ask, should I be drinking Manischewitz?  No.  No one should drink Manischewitz.  Ever.  Aside from the whole "morning drinking" thing, that shit is nasty.  However, any time one of us asks this kind of question, the foul taste of that vile concoction intrudes into our memories.  Let us let such things pass.  Instead, let us consider yet another debt ceiling crisis.  Will there be "a deal?"  I do not know.  That is not good.

Remember, of course, that "a deal" on the debt ceiling means that Joe Biden pays some but not all of the ransom demanded by the House Republican Party for not blowing up the nation's economy.  "Deal" is the wrong word.  "Deal" connotes (if not denotes) a mutual agreement.  This is entirely one-sided, because as I have observed repeatedly, Joe Biden already caved.  He is paying a ransom.  The question is whether or not he is, or can pay enough of a ransom for the House Republicans to let the hostages (us) go.

This time, it is different.  Why?

As I check my clock, it is time for another Thomas Schelling lecture.  You thought you had gotten away with it, didn't you?  Didn't you?  You thought we were going to go through this whole, damned hullaballoo without me ranting like a game theory madman about Thomas Schelling and the roots of the madman theory, didn't you?  To use one of my least-favorite expressions, yeah, no.  It is time for The Strategy of Conflict.

This morning, we consider the strategy of tying one's own hands.  Schelling noted that one can strengthen one's bargaining position by taking away one's own options.  If you can restrict your ability to cave in a negotiation, you can force the other side to cave.  This is a tempting idea for students who read Schelling, but seeing where it truly applies gets difficult.  The idea is that if you commit so fully to a position that a penalty will be imposed for backing down, then the act of committing can force your opponent to make a different choice.  Most of the situations in which students think they see this, though, are situations in which the actor can still back down costlessly.

However, consider Kevin McCarthy.  Is he a brilliant tactician, or a fuckin' idiot?

Actually, funny thing about Thomas Schelling.  He also observed that there can be a bargaining advantage to convincing your opponent that you are batshit.  That way, you can threaten to do crazy things that no sane person would do.  The trick is that you don't actually want to be batshit, because if you are batshit, you might do something self-destructive eventually.  The ideal is to look batshit, but not be batshit.

And darling, you look batshit!  (Sorry, I tried to type that with the Billy Crystal voice, but that reference is so old anyway that it doesn't matter.)

Anyway, Kevin McCarthy is an idiot.

Here's the problem.  Remember how McCarthy became Speaker?  Remember how many votes it took?  It wasn't just the number of votes.  He had to make a very dangerous and stupid concession.  The motion to vacate.  Technical reminder:  the motion to vacate is the motion to remove a speaker.

How many representatives are required to make a motion to vacate?

Now, today, one.  Because Kev' agreed to that as the threshold.  All it takes is one wingnut dissatisfied with the ransom the Democrats pay on the debt ceiling, and McCarthy faces a motion to vacate.

Just one.

Remember that Boehner lost the gavel because in 2011, he got Obama to pay a gigantic ransom in the form of the Budget Control Act, but after that, Obama stopped paying.  Boehner had to cave, and that led to his ouster.  Republicans love taking hostages.  It's their thing.

And McCarthy is an idiot, but he isn't that much of an idiot.  He didn't want to get Boehnered.  He knew that if the threshold for a motion to vacate were too low, he'd be in an even harder spot than Boehner.

Hu-hu.  Harder spot than Boehner.  Hu-hu.

Yeah, yeah.  He-he.

(I actually didn't realize what I had typed until I typed it.  That calls for some Beavis & Butthead.)

So McCarthy tried everything to avoid reducing the threshold for a motion to vacate, but you know what he wanted more than anything else?  The gavel.  He would do literally anything for that gavel, and I detest misuse of the word, "literally."  So, he yielded.  The threshold for a motion to vacate is one.

He cannot piss off even one, single member of that batshit caucus.

What does this mean for his bargaining position?  Is it strong, or weak?

This debt ceiling crisis is different from all other debt ceiling crises.

In a sense, McCarthy's bargaining position is strong because the low threshold for a motion to vacate tells Biden that McCarthy cannot cave.  He'll get ousted.

He will, if he caves.  So, McCarthy can credibly say to Joe Biden, "look, I know that this is totally unreasonable*, but if I yield, I face a motion to vacate, so I have to stick to this demand."

That is a lot of bargaining leverage.  That's straight Schelling, and it is more bargaining leverage than Boehner had.  (Of course, the right flank of the party had to oust Boehner to create that leverage, but there you go!)

But here's the other problem.  Can McCarthy actually pass anything in the House?  Biden is negotiating with McCarthy as though the little shitweasel speaks for his caucus.

He doesn't.  How many rounds of votes did it take for him to get the gavel, and how many concessions did he have to make in the process?  If McCarthy cannot get the votes, then the process is as follows.  The GOP demands that Biden make unilateral concessions, in exchange for the GOP concession of not melting down the economy, and then the GOP demands that the Democrats be the ones to vote for a GOP wishlist because the Republicans will not sully themselves voting for anything that isn't their full, original list of demands, even though the bill itself consists 100% of concessions to the GOP without one, single concession to the Democrats, unless you count not blowing up the country's economy.

(This is one of those posts that makes people think I'm a Democrat, I guess.)

McCarthy is negotiating as though he can get the votes, but I see no reason to think that he can.  He is a Speaker who speaks for whom?

So is his bargaining position strong, or weak?  He has a credible threat to nuke the economy, absolutely.  But, does he have the ability to make a "deal?"

That is what is really not clear.  And he may face a motion to vacate if the debt ceiling does get raised regardless.  Back in November, even before the vote-o-rama craziness, I was telling you that McCarthy may be fucked.  While... plugging my second book, because it explained the mathematics of the GOP's intra-party divisions on the debt ceiling and how that led to Boehner's ouster.

So now I make you nervous.  McCarthy can't cave, because then he faces a motion to vacate.  He can't get the votes for anything less than total victory in the House.  Total GOP victory cannot pass the Senate even if Biden agrees to it, because Democrats have a Senate majority.

So yes, this debt ceiling crisis is different from all other debt ceiling crises.

Also, I told you back when the Dems had control that their top priority should have been eliminating the debt ceiling.  Think of it as follows.  If all you had to do was pass a law, and Putin's nukes disappeared, how highly would you prioritize that legislative agenda item?  I'd put that at the top of my list.  The Democrats didn't do that with the debt ceiling.  They argued about stupid, petty shit, because that's them.

Gee... if only someone had warned them that their priorities were fucked...

OK, let's step out of my musical comfort zone.  The Dillinger Escape Plan, "The Threat Posed By Nuclear Weapons," from One Of Us Is The Killer.  When the vocalist shifts to that screaming thing, it is grating, but the rhythms and time signatures here are a mathematician's dream.

*Actually, Kevin McCarthy cannot credibly claim to know anything, because he is an idiot.