Countermoves to Republican "norm" violations

 I'm going to do a thing.  I'm going to acknowledge the existence of... Politico.  I don't like it, but occasionally, this is a thing that has to happen.  Why?  This morning, the occasion is that a gentleman named Seth Masket has lowered himself to provide them with an essay.  Whether or not you know the name depends on your knowledge of political scientists of my generation, but Seth is a very smart person, and a mensch.  And yet, he... wrote for... Politico.  I have done things in my life of which I am not proud, and perhaps upon reflection, when Seth is forced to look back on his life, and his scholarship, and his distinguished record in political science, adding to our collective body of knowledge, he will recognize that by lowering himself to work with... Politico, he perhaps did not live his best life in that moment.  Or perhaps he thought that he could elevate Politico by being a smart person who wrote for them.  That said, he got some stuff wrong, which occasions my mornin' blatherin'.

Yesterday, Seth wrote this piece for Politico.  The gist is that Republicans have spent years violating political norms, and Democrats have not, which is a pattern that has allowed the Republicans to make gains at the expense of the Democratic Party.  The observation is one more obscurely known as "asymmetric constitutional hardball."  Mark Tushnet coined the term, "constitutional hardball" (didn't I just reference this?) for tactics that are permitted by the Constitution, but in the old days, not used because a collective norm developed to avoid maximalist tactics.  The "asymmetric" part refers to the fact that these tactics have been used more by one party than the other.  Consider judicial nominations.  We can date the start of the confirmation wars to Robert Bork, who was defeated by Democrats, and yes, Democrats started the filibustering under the George W. Bush administration, but it was only a handful of judges.  The major escalations and maximalist tactics have been adopted more by Republicans, and in fact, one Republican specifically.  Mitch McConnell.  Blockading the D.C. Circuit, blockading a Supreme Court vacancy, adopting a fake rule for that vacancy and then breaking it to confirm Barrett...  That's not just the GOP, it's Mitch McConnell.  As I often write, when the epitaph for American democracy is written, it will say, "Murdered in cold blood by Mitch McConnell."  We can point to other examples, but norm violations have occurred on both sides, yet been asymmetric, hence the academically abstruse term, "asymmetric constitutional hardball."  Masket was just trying to pitch it to the Politico reader.  I'm writing for nobody, so I shall alternate between academic pretension and lowbrow fuckery.

Anyway, Masket notes that we have observed asymmetric constitutional hardball, and attributes the pattern to the premise that Republicans value outcomes over process, while Democrats value the small-d democratic process over outcomes, hence the Democrats have not responded in kind.  Masket then applies that thing that all of us political scientists use to explain every fucking thing under the ever-fucking-loving-sun:  the prisoner's dilemma, and hi!  I'm a political scientist too, which makes me guilty as charged.  In fact, I'm even more guilty of this than Seth, because I'm primarily a game theorist, whereas Seth is primarily an empiricist, so he is allowed to do the occasional, 'hey, lookie at the prisoner's dilemma' thing without it being a 'shut up about the goddamn prisoner's dilemma' moment.  I'm not, because I suck.  You are allowed to say this to any game theorist.  We all suck, and we all need to shut up about the prisoner's dilemma.  Masket is allowed the occasional indulgence.

OK, so here's how it works.  In an iterated prisoner's dilemma, what happens when one player defects, and the other doesn't?  And the dupe won't punish?  The player who defects gets a reward for being a douchebag, and doesn't get punished for it in the next round.  He keeps on being a douchebag.  Why?  Rationality.  If Player 1 gets to extract a payment from Player 2 in Round n by being a shit, and Player 2 won't punish Player 1 in Round n+1, then Player 1 will shit all over the place, all the time.

His name is Mitch McConnell, right?

So we're all good, right?

Here is where Masket loses the thread a bit.  There are a couple of errors.  There is a logical fallacy about the structure of game theoretic analysis, and an empirical problem, and they are connected in his analysis.  Let's start with the logical fallacy.  We call this the unitary actor fallacy.  A group is not a unitary actor, and you cannot model a group as a unitary actor.

There are unitary actors.  Joe Biden, for example, is a unitary actor.  Barack Obama?  Unitary actor.  Masket's arguments are spot-on as they apply to an individual president.

But the general structure of Masket's analysis is built on the premise that there are two actors, reduced to the "parties."  Party A (the shitbag party), and Party B (the grownup party).  Guess which is which.  Yet one of the foundational observations in microeconomic theory is that you cannot model a group as an individual.  I could go on a Kenneth Arrow rant, but that's not what is most relevant.  There's Mancur Olson, and the observation that everyone acting individually rationally will lead to collectively harmful outcomes, and we're getting closer to the point.  This is really more about internal party homogeneity, though, which gets us to models like "conditional party government."

The basic issue is that the Republican Party, at the elected level, is unified in their rejection of "norms."  They are unified in their belief that they can and should do anything and everything to beat/murder/kill the libtards.  Next time 'round, they aren't even going to be willing to certify a Democratic victory, even if those electoral votes have been certified at the state level.  They are unified on this, at the congressional level.  Why could Mitch McConnell say to Barack Obama, no judges for you?  Because his entire caucus is willing to go along with his power grab.

Masket describes "the Democratic Party" in a different way, but the problem is that the Democratic Party is very much not unified.  He lists issues like court-packing, and bemoans that they are not even on the table as constitutional hardball responses, but... they very much are on the table.  That is why he is mentioning it.  The fact that he is mentioning it is a demonstration of the fact that it is on the table.  That article?  That venue in which he published?  That's called, "the table."  Court-packing is, in technical terms, "on" it.  And Masket didn't put it there.  He heard, in technical, mathematical terms, "a fuckload" of people talking about it, and hence, referenced it.

Hey, look!  A table!  Why, what's that sitting on it?  An idea called, "court-packing."

Personally, I started talking about court-packing the day McConnell announced his response to Scalia's death, and I have been watching elected Democrats as well as aligned interest groups move in that direction since then.  Slowly?  Yes, but the fact that the discussion is there, and has been building is, itself, a demonstration that it is "on the table."  That discussion is the table.

But there aren't the votes, because unlike the Republican Party, the Democratic Party is heterogeneous.  That heterogeneity is precisely why we cannot describe the party as a unitary actor.  A group with homogeneous preferences-- mindless automatons-- can be described as a unitary actor, but a heterogeneous group cannot be.  So, those responses?  Those retaliations?  Those punishments?  Yes, they are on the table.  But because the Democrats are insufficiently unified for their non-majority once you factor in Manchin, they don't have the votes to carry it out.

So... what?  Hold a symbolic vote for court-packing?  Jurisdiction limitation?  Other ideas that are very much on the table?

Game this out.  The punishment is not carried out, so the Democrats have no credible threat of retaliation, but they give the GOP the campaign weapon by holding the vote on the unpopular thing?  No.  I'm no fan of Schumer.  I think is a tactical fool, and a withering, dithering caricature of everything the hardline left faction of the Democratic Party says when they point to the fecklessness of their own leadership.  And I can't stand the fucking left.  But putting "court-packing" or something like that up for a vote when it would go down in flames?

Mitch McConnell is begging for you to call for that vote.  Prove his point.  S.  Points.  All of them.  Prove your fecklessness, while simultaneously giving him a campaign weapon.

So... OK.  Masket got a bunch right, but a few things wrong.  That's better than usual for Politico, right?  But tomorrow, Seth will go back to being a political scientist following the rules of methodological rigor and adding to our collective body of knowledge with an even better ratio, and Politico will still suck.

Music.  Okan Ersan & The Istanbul Superband, "Quantumising Myself," from A Reborn Journey.