Game theory, deterrence, nuclear weapons and Vladimir Putin
One of the more terrifying notions with which the modern world is now confronted is the proposition that Vladimir Putin, frustrated and unable to impose Russian control on Ukraine, may resort to "tactical nuclear weapons." Two questions: will he do it, and how should the US respond? In response to the first question, the probability is much higher than I would like, and in response to the second question, unfortunately, we need to escalate the threat against Russia now. We need to threaten military action against Russia. Direct military action. Yeah, we need to threaten that in order to avoid it. Game theory. Remember the basic point about threats. The purpose of a threat is to induce a change in one's opponent's behavior, so that it need not be carried out, and our problem right now is that Putin is insufficiently afraid that we will carry out a threat. That needs to change. If it doesn't, nukes are on the table because we failed to threaten consequences. This is backwards and counterintuitive. That's game theory.
So here is where we are now. The US, Europe, and the democratic world are on a path to maximalist economic punishment. Europe is even moving towards eliminating Russian oil, which will be hard, but they are reducing, and moving in that direction. Our pathway right now is maximalist economic punishment. We are not at maximalist punishment, but that is only because the process of getting there is a process. There is no economic punishment we are capable of inflicting on Russia that we will not inflict at some point in the near future. Yet the fact that we are imposing maximalist economic punishment means that we have a Spinal Tap problem. The amp only goes to 10, and renumbering it doesn't do anything.
If we take direct military action off the table, as we have, and decide on maximalist economic punishment, then our course of action is set. What we do is unresponsive to Putin's actions. That means the case isn't technically game theory. It is "decision theory." We aren't a strategic actor anymore, having already made a decision, which is unresponsive. Putin chooses Option A, we inflict maximalist economic punishment. Putin chooses Option B, we inflict maximalist economic punishment.
So you may be thinking that there's also Option C, and maybe we remove some sanctions if Putin withdraws, makes restitution, etc., but yeah, that ain't gonna happen, so we don't need to bother examining that.
What are the options between which Putin is choosing? Conventional warfare, and tactical nukes. Let's just examine those. Within the realm of conventional warfare, we can include just bombing the shit out of Ukraine. Putin will murder countless people. That will continue to happen. He'll never control Ukraine, but he will continue to demolish it. Option B? Drop a couple of tactical nukes somewhere in Ukraine.
Why are we even talking about this? What would it gain Putin? It would not gain him control of Ukraine. They'll never just accept Russian rule, particularly not after nukes. However, it would do two things. It would scare the fuck out of everyone, and demonstrate the credibility of Putin's threats to nuke first, on no provocation.
What would that get him? The ability to go to another country and say, gimme or I nuke you. This is basic Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. The point is to demonstrate the credibility of the threat, for the next time around, and you do it by carrying it out. The problem with some threats is that they look non-credible. Nobody has used a nuclear weapon since WWII. We dropped two bombs on Japan to end WWII after, and this bears repeating, they attacked us. We then rebuilt them, without a military, and Japan's kinda cool now. Racist as all fuck, and plenty of other cultural problems, but on the world stage? Japan's awesome. Peace, capitalism, art, and no more goin' around startin' wars.
Since then? Nobody has used a nuke. Yeah, North Korea likes to threaten nukes, but mostly, we know that's bluster and bullshit. This is the scariest nuclear threat in a long time, and once Putin demonstrates a willingness to use nuclear weapons, once you break that seal, there's no doubt that the threat is credible, at least from his psychopathic ass.
So does Putin have something to gain? Yes.
The question is, what does he have to lose, because if he has nothing to lose, he will use a tactical nuke. In the realm of decision theory, if he thinks he has something to gain and nothing to lose, he drops a nuke. What does he think he gains? The murder of Ukrainians, and the credibility of the threat. To Putin, that's gain.
So what does he lose?
Here's the problem. If we are committed to maximalist economic punishment regardless, and no military response, then we have no response. That means he has nothing to lose. That means he nukes.
Vladimir Putin will use tactical nuclear weapons unless he thinks a military response from us is on the table. This needs to be game theory, rather than decision theory, and the problem is that we have committed to maximal economic punishment with no military response. That puts him in decision theory territory.
Of course, a tactical nuke puts us in question mark territory. What would we do? The National Security Council, the Pentagon, they all have to be putting together scenarios. None good. Here's the problem. There are no good scenarios after the nuke. The only way to handle the possibility is to deter the nuke by making it clear, loudly, that we will respond with force and escalation.
Game this out. We tell Putin, you nuke, we come for you. This has one of two effects. Either it stops him from using nukes, in which case, goal accomplished, or he nukes anyway.
What then? Best response, assuming it was a tactical nuke, massive, non-nuclear attack on Russian forces. (Don't escalate unnecessarily.) We've got some big shit. We show Russia what a real army can do, because fortunately for us, the fucking hippies have lost, and we have one.
If we had made the threat and caved, Putin would use the threat of nukes to march anywhere he wanted. If we didn't make the threat at all, and didn't respond militarily, he'd use the threat of nukes to march wherever he wanted. If Putin drops a nuke and doesn't face military consequences, he owns the fucking planet.
This is why we need to deter him. This is why we need to make clear that he cannot use nukes. Nukes are off the table. Because we say so. We're gaming this out in private.
No. Do it in public. Vladimir Putin needs to know exactly what the consequences will be.
Vladimir Putin is the embodiment of evil, and he fucked up. The invasion of Ukraine will go down in history as one of the biggest foul-ups in military history, but that does not mean Putin is irrational, and more than anything else, Putin wants what every autocrat wants. Power. If he sees that a tactical nuke can go unanswered, it is a path to more power. That means we need, not to answer it, but to deter it.
Now.
Biden took military action off the table at the beginning of this thing. Military action needs to go on the table. Loudly. Big time. This is a poker game, and this is the only way to get Putin to fold on the nukes issue. Time to make him fold.
And for music this morning, the great bassist, Charnett Moffett passsed away. In remembrance, we need one of his best sessions. Here he is on an all-time classic. Sonny Sharrock's "Promises Kept," from Ask The Ages.
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